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Abstract 
There is a strong sense of malaise surrounding climate politics today. This has been created at least 
in part by factors such as the chasm between the scale of action required and the adequacy of 
current political commitments, stalemate in global negotiations, the low price of carbon, and a 
growing sense of indifference, if not outright skepticism, amongst the publics of some developed 
countries about the severity of the threat posed by climate change. Within the policy community 
these issues are generally treated as different problems each to be overcome on their own terms. 
Yet, we argue, suggested solutions to these problems hold much in common - a focus on attributing 
agency, whether in the form of the capacity of institutions or to the behavior of individuals. What is 
often missing from such accounts of climate politics is a recognition that the problems of how 
agency is attributed in climate politics, what we might term governance traps, are structural in 
nature. Rather than focusing on attributing agency to respond to the challenges of governing climate 
change this requires that we address the conditions through which the challenges of governing 
climate change arise and which in turn serve to frame agency in particular ways. We suggest that 
examining the ways in which notions of responsibilities and rights are currently being framed within 
climate politics provides one way into these dynamics that can open up the critical questions we 
need to address as we approach the critical Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris in November 
2015.  
 
Introduction 
 
For many, the possibilities of realizing a political response to climate change seem an increasingly 
distant prospect. The existing climate policy architecture appears no longer capable of delivering the 
scale of action required to limit warming to an average of two degrees Celsius i ii iii iv v. Mechanisms 
and institutions established in order to put a price on carbon appear to have failed to give it 
sufficient value to engender a new carbon economy. Decades of campaigning to engage the public in 
‘doing their bit’ for climate change appear to fall on deaf ears. The consequences of these problems 
are profound. At one extreme, it has provided the basis for the resurgence of climate scepticism, 
and pessimism about the possibility of collective action. Elsewhere, it has led to the advocacy of 
more radical action, rejecting the institutional arrangements and financial mechanisms through 
which the past two decades of climate policy have been organized.vi 
 
Our research suggests that this dysfunction has emerged at least in part as a consequence of how 
climate solutions have been framed as a matter of enhancing both individual and collective agency. 
Across different scales and sites of governance, increasing knowledge, providing incentives, 
galvanizing action have all been lauded as means through which to overcome the current malaise. 
Yet such approaches tend to neglect the systemic nature of the current crisis of climate politics. 
Rather than being individual issues each to be addressed in turn, we suggest that they are connected 
by virtue of their reliance on a particular framing of climate politics that has come to shape the 
scope of possible action; allocating responsibilities in problematic and limited ways and locking in 
particular discourses of rights within dominant policy narratives. Moreover, the individual research 
projects upon which this opinion piece is based [see Further Reading at the end of this paper] 
suggest that the governance traps through which this malaise is manifest arise because of wider 
structural conditions which in turn have shaped how responsibility for addressing climate change 
has been framed, and hence where the imperative to act is seen to reside. Specifically, current 
approaches and proposals for how to navigate the current climate policy impasse often misread the 
agency different social actors have to respond, while simultaneously overlooking the ways in which 
the drivers of climate change are embodied in social structures. They are also often disempowering, 
and limited in terms of what can legitimately be questioned and acted upon. The effect of obscuring 
this is to lock in assumptions about what kinds of futures different parts of society have a right to, 
such as the high consumption lives of the richer world and existing inequities in access to resources. 
Consequently there is a need to open up these issues to critical enquiry in order to examine how 
alternative approaches to matters of political responsibility and rights might create new spaces for 
climate governance.  
 
The question of responsibility  
Though the just allocation of responsibility has been an aspiration of international climate 
negotiations and also policies within states, little has been done by political actors to convert general 
statements about responsibilities and rights into concrete equitable policies. Yet it is in the ways in 
which responsibilities are given (and contested) that we find the emergence of ‘governance traps’. 
Late-modern industrialized society has seen an evolution in modes of governing – from one where 
political power, responsibility for risks, and the ability to influence events are invested in centrally 
controlled political institutions and their agencies to one characterized by shared and devolved 
systems of risk governance. With the latter, more loosely coupled and multi-layered coalitions of 
actors and institutions (including those representing central governments) have to find less direct 
means of achieving their objectives with respect to ill-structured problems replete with uncertainty, 
ambiguity or ignorance, and a limited radius of action. Governance traps, in turn, comprise 
emergent situations where the agency to effect significant change within institutions and civil 
society becomes severely constrained either by the inherent complexity of the situation and the 
operation of competing interests, or an inappropriate allocation of responsibilities. As an example of 
the latter, in seeking to avoid the political risks of taking long-term action, governments’ actions on 
climate change have frequently placed responsibility back onto individuals, communities and firms 
through proposals for carbon foot-printing, carbon disclosure for firms and personal carbon 
allowances.vii However, our research suggests that people tend to believe that climate change is too 
big a problem for individuals to tackle alone and that primary responsibility lies with national 
governments, resulting in a ‘governance trap’ in which both the governing and the governed seek 
action from the other but where none is forthcoming.viii 
 
Our work also suggests emerging governance traps at the urban scale, where cities are now 
increasingly charged with responding to climate change, but often under conditions where they lack 
the capacities and resources to adequately address these challenges.ix The same is true of different 
forms of private governance, where firms may seek to make contributions to a low carbon economy 
but find a lack of direction from government serves to undermine their scope for action. In many 
contexts, rather than positive ‘long, loud, legal’ signals about the direction of change towards a 
lower carbon economy,x investors are faced with shifting degrees of political support for renewable 
energy for example. 
  
Across these examples we find a systemic set of issues that are driving the emergence of a range of 
governance traps, rather than a set of discrete problems. At the heart of the climate malaise, we 
suggest, is the framing assumption that responsibility for action can readily be allocated to discrete 
agents, without attention to their capabilities, and that the capacity to act can be produced through 
the right mix of information and incentives. This framing of responsibility serves to shape how the 
climate problem is constructed and acted upon. For the most part responsibility has been attributed 
to nation-states, firms, and individual households. These agents are simultaneously viewed as the 
source of the problem and the solution. Yet the assumptions and basis for allocating responsibility 
remain questionable. Moreover, ascribing responsibility to actors – be they individuals, cities, or 
firms – with insufficient agency is not only ineffective, but may alienate them from the political 
process. It also masks the systemic and structural nature of the problem, and the need for different 
forms of collective and community-driven action that is seen to be fair, inclusive and effective in 
working across and through these scales. To start to rethink responsibilities, we suggest that there 
are two fundamental issues that need to be addressed: first, how these lines of causal responsibility 
are drawn; and second, on what basis moral responsibility is attributed to agents. 
 
The Scale of the Problem 
 
At the global level, attribution of causal responsibility based only on the production, rather than 
consumption, of GHG emissions generates a misleading picture. This potentially displaces 
responsibility in unjust ways and raises a real challenge about how cross-border responsibility should 
be allocated. The often cited example is the outsourcing of carbon-intensive production to China, 
which then exports ‘embodied carbon’ back to wealthier regions.xi In this sense Wales is unique 
within the UK in that it exports more embodied carbon than it imports.xii However, a critical issue 
underlying the current production/territorial approach is who controls decisions with respect to 
polluting technology.   
 
Take the Welsh example, where much of the exported carbon is produced at a small number of key 
point sources. One of these is the Port Talbot steelworks in the Tata Steel operation, which is the 
biggest single source of emissions generated within Wales, accounting for 30% of carbon covered by 
EU ETS in 2011.xiii However, as an EU-ETS signatory, Tata’s emissions may not be considered among 
those for which the Welsh Government has devolved responsibility. Port Talbot represents a case of 
both a major polluter and an important employer in the Welsh economy where the local pain of 
reduced operations may not be offset by reduced global emissions if the company merely re-locates 
elsewhere. As such, it provides a concrete example of the need to focus on consumption based 
emissions given the limited agency of some regions/nations to address their production of 
emissions. A starting point to this process is already in place through the UNFCCC Climate 
Technology Centre and Network, which has the mission of stimulating technology cooperation, 
development and transfer in a way that is consistent with countries’ respective capabilities as well as 
their national circumstances and priorities. 
 
Systems of production and consumption 
 
Even where new ways of drawing lines of causal responsibility can be calculated, the ways in which 
institutions, infrastructures, and past and present policy measures enable and constrain 
consumption patterns are routinely overlooked, and consequently unchallenged.  In short, they 
remain beyond the scope of what responding to climate change involves. Individuals do not 
consciously decide to emit carbon. Rather, emissions are associated with the practices and routines 
of everyday life, from cooking to travelling. Yet this flies in the face of many existing policy 
approaches grounded in an ‘ABC’ model of consumer behaviour change – which assumes that 
individual attitudes (the A) drive behaviour (the B) and choice (the C).xiv  The limits of this model are 
obvious. For example, people who live in rural or suburban areas may find themselves locked into 
forms of car-dependence simply by poor provision of public transport. Moreover, changing 
conventions of daily life are routinely bound up with the evolution of material and technical systems 
over which individuals may have little control. Interpretations of comfort and of the ‘need’ to heat 
and cool buildings to a steady 22⁰C whatever the weather outside are not facts of nature, nor are 
they simply expressions of individual preference and choice.  These issues require opening up 
discussions regarding the definition of taken for granted needs and the different means by which 
warmth and welfare, freedom and mobility, and economic and energy security might be achieved in 
different settings. This will bring into focus issues of both responsibility and rights associated with 
different trajectories that are more or less carbon intensive, and draws attention to fundamental 
questions about what energy and mobility are ‘for’ and how these ‘needs’ themselves evolve.   
 
Recognising Rights 
 
Whether it is about the right to development in the climate negotiations or the impacts of climate 
change on basic human rights, ‘rights talk’ runs through all aspects of climate policy.xv Yet often 
appeals to rights are framed in ways that sustain the forms of response which further entrench 
climate governance traps. What is needed here is more critical reflection about what kinds of rights 
are systematically assumed and excluded from current forms of climate governance, and an 
awareness of the ways in which different forms of response shape the nature of the rights that can 
be claimed or exercised. 
 
 
Questioning Presumed Rights: Which rights count and what’s off limits? 
 
Most fundamentally, climate change poses a severe threat to fundamental human rights – such as 
the right to life, to food and water, to health and to an adequate standard of living.xvi By focusing 
exclusively on aggregate measures like economic growth as the means through which to measure 
their success, dominant narratives of what is at stake in addressing climate change ignore the ways 
in which responding to climate change has differential impacts on those already excluded from 
economic growth, including vulnerable peoples and minorities, they understate the need for urgent 
and effective action, and neglect the ethical case for compensation in cases of noncompliance. 
 
Rights enter into the picture in a second way.  Responses to climate change have been framed not 
only by the physical risks involved, but also by assumptions about what aspects of current societies 
cannot be challenged:  specifically the unquestioned assumption that citizens in affluent societies 
have rights to a high consumption and carbon intensive lifestyle and to continuous economic 
growth.  Yet, in order to move beyond existing governance traps, there is need for an enlarged 
debate regarding which ways of life and expectations society is prepared to challenge in responding 
to climate change. Richer consumers’ presumption of asserted ‘rights’ to certain indoor 
temperatures, limitless car use or imported food has enormous implications for poorer people’s 
realisation of basic rights to food and energy. The debate about rights and responsibilities needs to 
reflect the highly integrated but hugely uneven nature of the global economy. It is inappropriate 
simply to assume that the status quo should be the baseline when thinking about future patterns of 
consumption and practice. Instead, space must be created for debating alternative conceptions of 
prosperity and economic development, in order to establish a renewed sense of what it might be 
possible to achieve in to the context of climate change. 
 
This calls into question whether attempts to shift to a low carbon society should focus on rights to a 
fair share of greenhouse gas emissions (say, equal per capita emissions) or whether, given a small 
and decreasing carbon budget, it would be more plausible and more productive to focus instead on 
rights to serve and promote certain interests (in food, health, mobility, education and, at a more 
general level, in energy). Focusing on rights to emissions threatens to distract people from what 
really matters (the enjoyment of a reasonable and decent standard of living and quality of life) and 
to make progress towards a sustainable society much harder.xvii Focusing on rights to a sustainable 
society and equitable standard of living raises different kinds of policy solutions, for example it 
makes clear the imperative for investment in, and the effective transfer of, clean technology and the 
need to meet development objectives alongside those directly related to climate change. 
 
Making rights real 
 
Recognising the structural nature of how rights are narrated and encountered in relation to climate 
change also requires a focus on designing policy responses that tackle climate change in ways that 
do not compromise the rights of others and do not exacerbate or entrench existing inequalities.xviii  
Our research shows that in an integrated global economy decisions made in richer countries about 
climate change mitigation and adaptation have widespread, frequently negative impacts elsewhere. 
Whether it is the drive for biofuels which can have adverse effects on food security and land rights in 
poorer regions of the world,xix or the use of carbon offset mechanisms, more ambitious climate 
policy cannot come at the expense of the livelihood rights of the world’s poor. For example, the 
Renewable Energy Directive in the EU targets 10% of transport fuels to come from renewable 
sources by 2020.xx However, responsibility for delivering this target has been displaced overseas, 
with palm oil production in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia consolidated into large-scale 
plantations, squeezing out smallholder livelihoods that are unable to compete. xxi  Fulfilling 
responsibility by undermining the rights of other actors only risks entrenching the antagonisms and 
distrust which has hampered international mitigation efforts to date. 
 
In an interdependent world, procedural justice and enforceable redress mechanisms have to be built 
into discussions about which climate policy pathways to pursue.xxii Central to meeting this challenge 
is the protection of procedural rights:  rights to information, consultation and, crucially, meaningful 
democratic inclusion in the decision-making process. Lack of procedural justice (and a corresponding 
lack of rights to participate in the political process) may negatively impact distributive justice. For 
example, those communities most affected by having to host carbon offset projects often lack 
awareness of consultative processes, resulting in allegations of dispossession, violence and even 
human rights abuses which bodies like the CDM Executive Board then have to address.xxiii The rush 
to act and get projects approved in the name of emissions reductions can result in negative social 
impacts if proper procedures are not respected: failing to get rights ‘right’ comes at a high cost. 
 
Conclusion 
Addressing fundamental issues of responsibility and rights is critical as they underpin the structure, 
design and likely success of current forms of climate governance. We have suggested that emerging 
‘governance traps’ across the climate change domain are at least in part related to the ways in which 
matters of responsibilities and rights are framed, and that these frames in turn serve to 
systematically structure what is and is not considered to be appropriate in terms of climate 
responses. Moving beyond the existing malaise, we argue, requires that these lines are redrawn. 
None of these issues will be easily resolved, certainly not in the short term, and particularly when a 
great deal of effort and powerful interests are invested in allocating rights and responsibilities in 
ways which serve their interests and protect their entitlements. But continuing with policies that 
misread the agency different groups have, that work with out-dated models of public understanding 
and engagement, or allocate risks and responsibilities in socially unjust and environmentally 
ineffective ways comes at a high cost and may even intensify the current state of climate malaise.  
 
Policy-makers need to provide clear and unambiguous signals that convey the sustained 
commitment of appropriately empowered levels of government to addressing climate change. That 
is, rather than seeking to dismiss public concerns about the scale of the challenge and their efficacy 
in addressing it, they need to address such concerns by showing strong leadership and a willingness 
to take responsibility for radical and politically challenging action to address climate change. This 
could include rethinking urban planning, promoting lower carbon transport, energy and industrial 
infrastructures. It could also involve discontinuing support for fossil fuels through divesting 
government investments and pension funds from fossil-fuel companies. Decision-making must also 
be transparent and uphold key rights. This is not limited to procedural rights to information, 
consultation and democratic decision-making. Both international and national decision-making must 
aim to take account of income and wealth differentials and regional disparities within as well as 
between nations. Clarity is also required about individual rights in a carbon constrained world: do 
people have a right to a certain level of emissions or rather access to resources in order to ensure a 
just standard of living? 
 
Finally, market mechanisms and environmental regulations must be subject to effective governance 
to ensure that they do not displace responsibility and associated risks for emissions reductions onto 
the less powerful (e.g. through ‘carbon leakage’ from relocating production to less regulated 
jurisdictions). Rather, reducing the emissions intensity of both production and consumption 
decisions should involve policy-makers and decision-makers in public sector organisations, business 
and industry (including supply chain partners) taking and sharing responsibility for changing both 
directly polluting technologies and the socio-technical systems that lock people into high carbon 
lifestyles.  
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